We develop a reference dependent model with an initial endowment and in a world where alternatives are grouped into categories. The model creates a link between the agent's exogenous endowment and her endogenous reference point. The actual reference point is the best feasible alternative, according to the agent's preferences, which belongs to her endowment's category. This endogenous reference point induces a constraint set from which the final choice is made according to utility maximization. The model gives rise to category bias which generalizes the status quo bias by attracting the agent to her endowment's category but not necessarily to the endowment itself. We show that it accommodates recent experimental findings regarding the presence and absence of status quo bias in the realm of uncertainty. We apply the model to a stylized financial setup and show that it may lead to a risk premium even with risk neutral agents.
Introduction
Many empirical studies in behavioral economics, psychology and marketing have established that individuals' decisions depend on reference points. One type of reference effects is triggered by the decision maker's possession of a good, i.e., her status quo option or endowment. The status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) and the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) are two examples where agents' choices and evaluations of goods are influenced by the alternative which they currently own. Reference dependent behavior may also feature in choice situations with no designated reference alternative. One example is the attraction effect (Huber et al., 1982) where the addition of an alternative which is clearly dominated by one alternative in the choice set may shift preferences in the direction of the dominating item. The presence of a non-feasible alternative which the agent can observe but not choose, has also been found to affect choices, a phenomenon known as the phantom effect (Pratkanis and Farquhar, 1992) .
While the evidence supporting reference dependence is large, relatively little is known about what determines the reference point. Following the experimental findings, the theoretical literature has largely developed along two paths. According to one approach, the reference point is the agent's exogenous endowment or status quo option. Recent models which take this approach are Ortoleva (2010) , Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) and Riella and Teper (2014) . The status quo has also been used in many applications of the loss aversion model (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991) as the point from which the agent contemplates gains and losses. According to the second approach, the reference point is determined endogenously either by the decision maker herself, as in Barbos (2010) , Guney et al. (2015) and Ok et al. (2015) , or by the economic environment as in Koszegi and Rabin (2006) .
In this paper we propose to link the two approaches together in a way which seems natural in various choice contexts. The agent's endowment affects the agent's preferences but only insofar as "directing" her to the actual reference point, a point which is similar to her endowment and therefore easily identified in the choice set. To illustrate, consider an agent shopping for a laptop and suppose she currently owns a Mac. As she enters the store, she immediately recognizes a newer version of a Mac which she likes better than her own. This immediate recognition comes from the fact that all Mac laptops share similar features and she is therefore able to identify the best one on the spot. From this point on, if there is a reference point influencing her decisions, it is more likely to be the newly identified Mac than the one she owns. After all, by this stage of the decision process, she has probably made a mental note that she will not be keeping her old Mac and at the very least switch to the new one. Thus the new Mac becomes the agent's new point of perspective from which other alternatives may be considered.
The link from the endowment to the reference point is made possible through added structure we impose on the grand space of alternatives -the structure of disjoint categories. As in the above example, alternatives which belong to the same category will have the interpretation of being easy to compare, as opposed to alternatives which belong to different categories. 1 Absent an endowment our agent acts as a standard rational decision maker who maximizes a utility function over the set of feasible alternatives. However, given an endowment, our agent follows a 3-step procedure. In the first step, she determines the reference point by identifying the best feasible alternative which belongs to the endowment's category. This alternative, which is immediately recognized due to the ease of comparison within categories, serves as her endogenous reference point while the exogenous endowment becomes irrelevant for the remainder of the choice procedure.
In the second step, the reference effects kick in. The newly identified reference point induces a set of alternatives which the agent considers for the final stage of the decision process. Alternatives that do not belong to this set are excluded from any further consideration. We will think of this set as a "psychological constraint" that may lead the agent to disregard alternatives which would have been chosen absent an endowment. Finally, from this set the agent chooses the best feasible alternative according to her endowmentfree utility function. The model imposes a monotonic structure on these constraint sets: Within categories, the better the alternative, the smaller the constraint set it generates. Put differently and more intuitively, our agent considers fewer alternatives for her final choice, the more content she is with her current reference point. Figure I illustrates this procedure (notice that higher utility corresponds to a higher physical position of the alternative in the figure) . Absent an endowment the agent chooses alternative s which carries the highest utility in the entire set. Now suppose that the agent has an initial endowment, denoted by x. In the shaded region we have all alternatives which belong to the endowment's category. The agent first identifies z, which is the best feasible alternative in this category. In turn, z induces a constraint set which contains all alternatives which are deemed "choosable" from its perspective (the striped area). Finally, the agent chooses the best feasible alternative within that set, denoted by s .
Our model is derived using the revealed preference method. The main behavioral assumption of the model is called Categorical Referential Equivalence (CRE). This novel postulate formally states that, for any set S and any two alternatives x and y in S that belong to the same category, we have c(S, x) = c(S, y). In other words, any two alternatives that share the same category, have the same effect on choice when serving as the endowment. We also impose the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) for a given endowment, which translates into the strong rationality structure exhibited by our decision maker. Two more axioms state the extent to which the agent tends to stick to his status quo option. Our main result shows that these four axioms are satisfied if and only if the agent follows the 3-step choice procedure described above.
The model generalizes the well known status quo bias, the behavioral tendency of individuals to stick to their initial endowment (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988 Figure I: Choice Procedure for such behavior in choice problems where the endowment is also the best feasible option in its category. However, when this is not the case, it predicts what we dub category bias, i.e., a tendency to choose alternatives which are "similar" to the endowment (belong to the same category) but not the endowment itself. One novel prediction which arises from our model, is that when facing alternatives which belong to a single category, our agent will exhibit no behavioral biases. The reason is that she is immediately able to spot the best alternative within a category and in the absence of alternatives from other categories, this step reveals her final choice. In these situations our agent will act as a completely rational agent.
This prediction is in line with recent studies which report mixed evidence regarding the emergence of status quo bias in the world of uncertainty. In a controlled lab environment, Roca et al. (2006) find that when the endowment is ambiguous (a gamble with unspecified probabilities) while the alternative is risky (a gamble with known and specified probabilities) status quo bias is present. Maltz and Romagnoli (2015) support these findings and report the same result when the options' roles are reversed, i.e., the endowment is risky while the alternative is ambiguous. However, they also find that when both options are risky, or both ambiguous, the bias is absent. If one categorizes alternatives in this context into risky gambles and ambiguous gambles, our model is able to accurately predict this pattern of choice behavior. Moreover, other models of choice with initial endowment, such as those based on the loss aversion model of Kahneman and Tversky (1991) and the incomplete preference models a-la Bewley (1986) are unable to accommodate these findings. We further discuss this choice pattern and its relation to our model in section 3.
The suggested procedure also opens a channel for risk premium even in the presence of a risk neutral agent. In a stylized financial application we assume that the agent views her options as grouped into uncertain investments and riskless investments. If her money is initially deposited in the checking account she may view a riskless investment with a higher interest rate than her checking account as her reference point. In section 4 we show how this may lead the agent to consider only uncertain alternatives which are "very attractive", generating a risk premium in the process.
Our work may be viewed as a bridge between the exogenous reference point approach and the endogenous reference formation approach mentioned above. The closest to our work belongs to the former, and has been introduced by Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) . As in our work, their agent is a constrained maximizer but the identity of the reference point that generates the constraint set is different. In their model it is the exogenous endowment, while in ours it typically is not. Specifically, in the presence of at least one alternative which belongs to the endowment's category and is preferred to the endowment by the agent, the reference points in the two models will differ. In these circumstances, the generated constraint sets will also differ, leading in turn to different predictions (see section 2.5).
We also relate to work which introduces categories into the decision making process. Some recent examples include Barbos (2010) , Manzini and Mariotti (2012) and Furtado et al. (2015) . These models differ significantly from ours as they do not incorporate the agent's endowment into the decision problem and are mainly focused on menu effects in choice. As in Barbos (2010) categories in our setup are exogenous. 2 Thus, we assume that on top of alternatives' intrinsic value and specific characteristics they are also grouped together into disjoint categories by some shared features, such as brand name in our laptop illustration, or country of origin in other applications. 3 In most contexts mentioned above, categories seem natural and easy to observe. In others however, it may be impossible for an outside investigator to predict a priori what are the categories that the agent views (for example, the color of the product or the brand). In such circumstances one may learn about the categories from the agent's behavior by examining the model's main behavioral postulate, i.e., the CRE axiom. Alternatively, the agent may simply be asked whether some classification of the space of alternatives comes to mind. Once the relevant categories for our decision maker have been sorted out, the model may be applied to derive predictions.
Importantly, even if one finds difficulties in identifying the "correct" categories or if there seem to be no shared features across alternatives, the model may still be applied using the finest partition, i.e., assuming that every category is a singleton. In fact, in this case, the model reduces to the model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) and provides predictions which are very well suited to a world in which alternatives do not share common features. Thus, our added structure expands on the existing literature and nests the standard approach (in the sense of no similarity structure on the space of alternatives) as a special case.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we lay the foundations and state the main result. Later in this section we provide examples and a comparison which highlights the differences between this model and the one derived by Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) . Section 3 examines the model's predictions in light of recent findings regarding status quo bias under uncertainty. In section 4 we consider a financial setting, and illustrate how the link to the endogenous reference point can generate a risk premium even when the agent is risk neutral. Section 5 concludes.
Model

The basic framework
Let X be the grand set of alternatives and assume |X| < ∞. The members of X are denoted as x, y, z, etc.. We assume there exists an exogenous partition on the set X, denoted by X = X 1 X 2 , ..., X n for some n ∈ N. Each cell in the partition should be thought of as a category of goods, i.e., a group of alternatives linked by some characteristic. For every z ∈ X we denote by X z the cell in the partition which z belongs to.
Following Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) we designate ♦ to denote an object which does not belong to X. We let Ω X denote the set of all nonempty subsets of X. By a choice problem we mean a list (S, σ) where S ∈ Ω X and σ ∈ S ∪ {♦} . 4 The set of all choice problems is denoted by C(X). The interpretation of a choice problem (S, x) with x ∈ S is that the decision maker has to choose an alternative from S while currently endowed with x ∈ S. Alternatively, a choice problem (S, ♦) is interpreted as a choice from S absent an endowment. 5 By a choice correspondence in this setup we mean a function c : C(X) → Ω X , such that c(S, σ) ⊆ S for every (S, σ) ∈ C(X).
4 Note that by this formulation, the endowment is always available for choice. 5 The symbol ♦ is convenient as it allows us to describe a choice problem with or without an endowment in a unified manner.
Axioms
We introduce four axioms. The first is the classical rationality requirement which imposes structure on the agent's behavior given a fixed endowment.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). For any (S, σ) and (T, σ) in C(X),
This axiom is a consistency requirement imposed on the agent's behavior and it warrants that utility maximization takes place for any given endowment. Notice that in the absence of an endowment this is the exact same behavioral postulate as the one stated in the classical model of rational choice. Our next axiom links choices across different endowment structures. Specifically, it requires the agent to exhibit a (weak) tendency to choose her endowment.
Weak Status Quo Bias (WSQB).
For any x, y ∈ X, y ∈ c({x, y} , x) implies y ∈ c({x, y} , ♦) and y ∈ c({x, y} , ♦) implies y ∈ c({x, y} , y.)
This property was originally introduced by Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) . It is a natural postulate to impose on an agent who may be vulnerable to the status quo bias. Put simply, it states that serving as an endowment can only enhance an alternative's possibility of being chosen over another. More specifically, if y is chosen over x when x is the status quo option then it must also be chosen over x in the absence of a status quo option. The second part is similar -if y is revealed preferred to x without a status quo option then it must also be revealed preferred to it when acting as the status quo. 6 It is important to note that the axiom is stated in a "weak" fashion which allows the decision maker to exhibit, or not to exhibit status quo bias, depending on the alternatives at hand. Specifically, a rational agent who completely ignores her endowment will satisfy this axiom.
The first two axioms are independent of the underlying category structure imposed on the space of alternatives. Our next behavioral assumption, which we consider the main axiom of our model, links choice behavior across different endowments from the same category. Put succinctly, it states that two alternatives which belong to the same category will have the same effect on choice when serving as an endowment.
Categorical Referential Equivalence (CRE). For any given
provided that x, y ∈ S ∩ X x .
According to CRE, whether the agent is shopping for a laptop while currently endowed with an old MAC or in the possession of a newer MAC should have no effect on her final choice, as long as both MACs are available for choice. If WSQB is viewed as weakly highlighting the status quo option in the decision maker's mind then, combined with CRE, it implies that this option weakly highlights its category rather than itself. This axiom is at the heart of the model and the representation to follow and is novel as far as we know.
The last axiom describes situations in which the presence of a status quo option would not have any effect on choice. Roughly, it states that if the status quo option belongs to a "bad" enough category the decision maker will disregard it.
Categorical Status Quo Irrelevance (CSQI). For any given
Suppose the decision maker faces a choice problem (S, x). Moreover, suppose that for any subset T of S, that contains all alternatives in S which belong to x's category and at least one alternative which does not, the decision maker chooses at least one alternative outside the category of x. According to CSQI, the choice from (S, x) will be the same as the choice from (S, ♦). In other words, if the agent chooses "outside" her endowment's category whenever possible, her endowment would be irrelevant. 7 Remark 1. The four axioms are logically independent as proven in Appendix B.
Partial Characterization
We start by stating a lemma en route to our main representation theorem.
Lemma 1 Let X be a non-empty finite set such that X = X 1 X 2 , ..., X n for some n ∈ N. Let c be a choice correspondence on C(X). If c satisfies WARP, WSQB, CRE and CSQI, then there exists a (utility) function U : X → R and a self-correspondence Q on X such that for every S ∈ Ω X c(S, ♦) = arg max U (S) (i) and for every (S, x) ∈ C(X),
where z ∈ arg max U (S ∩ X x ). Moreover, for any
Lemma 1 provides sufficient conditions for the choice procedure outlined in the introduction. To understand the representation, let c be a choice correspondence on C(X), U a real function on X, Q a self-correspondence on X and suppose that the representation holds for any choice problem (S, σ) ∈ C(X). Facing a choice problem without an initial endowment, the agent settles her problem by maximizing the utility function U. That is, in this case, her final choice is the solution to the problem:
In turn, when facing a choice problem with a given status quo option, say (S, x) the agent proceeds in steps. First, she identifies the best alternative in S that belongs to the same category as x which we denote by z. We can think of the decision maker as starting off by making an "easy" evaluation, i.e., only considering alternatives which are (according to our category interpretation) easy to compare to x. Formally, z is the solution to the following maximization problem:
Once this step is complete the agent ignores her initial endowment and treats z as her endogenous reference point. This point induces a "psychological constraint set" Q(z) outside of which all alternatives are excluded from any further consideration. Put differently, the agent forms the set S ∩ Q(z) from which the final choice will be made. (This set is non-empty since z ∈ S and by (ii) and the fact that {x} = c({x} , x) we have x ∈ Q(x) for every x ∈ X).
Finally, the agent evaluates all alternatives in the set S ∩ Q(z) and chooses the best one according to her reference free utility function U. Formally:
If only z belongs to S ∩ Q(z) then the decision maker will pick z, thus exhibiting "category bias". If in addition z = x, i.e., x is the best alternative in S ∩ X x , the agent will exhibit status quo bias. On the other hand, if there are other alternatives in S ∩ Q(z) besides z, she may or may not choose within her endowment's category. 8 
Utility x X 's Category
Initial endowment
Choice without x
Choice with x C({x ,x ,z ,z },x )=z C({x ,z ,z },x )=z WARP Violation: Property (iii) imposes structure on the relationship between the constraint set Q and the utility function U . It states that within a category, the constraint sets are monotonically ordered. Specifically, they shrink as one considers reference points with higher utility. This highlights the intuition that there will be fewer alternatives to consider the more satisfied the agent is with her reference. 9 In summary, the role of the exogenous endowment x amounts to highlighting the category to which it belongs and "directing" the decision maker to the best feasible alternative in that category to be treated as an endogenous reference point. The role of the endogenous reference point z is to generate the constraint set Q(z). The reference effects kick in whenever the constraint set eliminates alternatives which are utility superior to z.
Characterization of the Main Model
Lemma 1 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of U, Q and the representation given by equations (i),(ii) and property (iii) to hold. However, one can easily provide an example to show that they are not necessary for this type of representation. In fact, the only axiom that is not satisfied by this representation is WARP as shown by the following example illustrated in Figure II .
Consider a world of four alternatives grouped into two categories. Formally, X = {x 1 , x 2 } {z 1 , z 2 } . As can be seen in the figure, the utility ranking of the alternatives is U (z 1 ) > U (z 2 ) > U (x 1 ) > U (x 2 ) (as in Figure I , a higher location on the figure translates to a higher utility). In addition Q(x 2 ) = X and Q(x 1 ) = {x 1 , z 2 } . In this case we have c({x 1 , x 2 , z 1 , z 2 } , x 2 ) = {z 2 } , but removing x 1 from the choice set leads to c({x 1 , z 1 , z 2 } , x 2 ) = {z 1 } violating WARP in the process.
This example illustrates some type of non-monotonicity in the set Q(x) which is allowed by our choice procedure. Although the monotonicity implied by property (iii) of Lemma 1 is satisfied (indeed, Q(x 1 ) ⊂ Q(x 2 )) there is a violation of monotonicity with respect to alternatives which are considered from the point of view of x 1 . While z 2 ∈ Q(x 1 ) we see that z 1 / ∈ Q(x 1 ) although z 1 is better than z 2 in the endowment-free sense. Moreover, z 1 is considered from the point of view of x 2 ∈ X x 1 which, roughly speaking, means that from the "point of view of the category of x 1 " the agent does consider z 1 .
In this section we impose a condition which strengthens the relationship between U and Q, and rules out this type of behavior. It states that, if z / ∈ X x is considered from the point of view of x then so will other alternatives outside of X x as long as: (1) they carry higher utility than z, and (2) they are considered from the point of view of some alternative in x's category. Formally, suppose that, as in Lemma 1, U is a real function on X and Q is a self-correspondence on X.
Definition 1 We say that Q is U -monotonic with respect to dissimilar alternatives if for every x 1 ∈ X and z 1 , z 2 / ∈ X x 1 such that:
Theorem 1 Let X be a non-empty finite set such that X = X 1 X 2 , ..., X n for some n ∈ N. Let c be a choice correspondence on C(X). Then c satisfies WARP, WSQB, CRE and CSQI if, and only if, there exists a (utility) function U : X → R and a self-correspondence Q on X such that for every S ∈ Ω X c(S, ♦) = arg max U (S)
and for every (S, x) ∈ C(X),
where z ∈ arg max U (S ∩ X x ) and (a) For any
(b) Q is U -monotonic with respect to dissimilar alternatives.
The representation given in Theorem 1 describes the exact same choice procedure as in Lemma 1. The only difference (except for it being a characterization) is that it imposes more structure on the relationship between U and Q. First, as in Lemma 1 they satisfy negative comonotonicity within categories, i.e., the better the alternative the smaller the constraint set it induces. Second, it requires the type of monotonicity of Q with respect to U given by Definition 1.
Remark 2. [Illustration of properties (a) and (b)]
Another way to view the structure imposed by properties (a) and (b) on the constraint set Q is the following: Let x ∈ X. Starting within the category X x , Q(x) may be thought of as the upper contour set of x, that is Q(x) ∩ X x = x ↑ ∩ X x , where x ↑ = {z ∈ X|U (z) ≥ U (x)} . Now consider x 1 which is the worst alternative according to U in X x . By property (a), Q(x 1 ) is the largest constraint set generated by any member of X x . Q(x) ∩ X c x is a subset of Q(x 1 ) ∩ X c x with the following structure: It contains all alternatives in Q(x 1 ) ∩ X c x with utility above a certain threshold. In Figure III we provide an illustration for the structure of the Q sets outside the category of x. The largest set is generated by x 1 (the area striped by the horizontal lines)
} is the smallest constraint set (the area striped with 3 different lines) . Notice that alternatives y 1 , y 2 and y 3 that do not belong to Q(x 1 ) ∩ X c x do not belong to the other constraint sets either, no matter how high their utility level. (a') For any x 1 , x 2 ∈ X such that
Property (a' ) states that the comonotonic relationship between U and Q is essential only outside the reference point's category and may be weakened to a one-sided implication. Moreover, alternatives with utility levels below that of the reference point may be added to the constraint set with no effect on choice (as the final stage of the procedure is utility maximization, such alternatives are later ignored by the agent). Property (a") states that within the reference point's category, the only alternatives which must be included in the constraint set are those with the same utility as the reference point. Since the reference point is the maximal feasible option in its category, adding alternatives with lower (or higher) utility within that category, will have no effect on the actual constraint. 10 Remark 4.
[Uniqueness] The weaker conditions discussed in the above remark lead us to the uniqueness structure of the representation: Let U and U be two real functions on X, and let Q and Q be two self-correspondences on X such that the representation described in Theorem 1 holds, for both (U, Q) and (U , Q ). Then, and only then, there is a strictly increasing map f : U (X) → R such that U = f • U and,
•
In other words, the utility function is unique up to a strictly positive transformation, as in standard utility representations. For any reference point, the constraint sets must agree outside its category when restricted to alternatives ranked higher than the reference itself. In addition they must both contain all alternatives within the reference's category which carry the same utility as the reference point.
A Comparison to Masatlioglu and Ok (2014)
As discussed earlier, the above model (referred to in this section as the category bias model ) shares similar features with the model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) (henceforth the status quo bias model or in short SQB model ). In this section we briefly describe the main representation of the SQB model and outline the similarities as well as main distinctions between the two models. The decision maker in the SQB Model behaves as if she has a (utility) function U and a self-correspondence Q on X and her choices from any choice problem (S, σ) are described by:
and,
Both models represent choices as arising from simple utility maximization in the absence of an endowment and they both share the constrained maximization step in the presence of one. The main difference between the two lies in which alternative generates the constraint set. In the SQB Model it is the exogenous endowment while in our model it is the endogenous reference point which may or may not be the endowment. When facing choice sets in which the exogenous endowment is the best feasible alternative (in the endowment-free sense) in its category, it will also be the alternative that generates the constraint set. Specifically, this occurs when it is the only available alternative in that category. Thus, in the case of the finest partition on X the models coincide. However, when a utility improving alternative in its category is available, our decision maker will abandon her exogenous endowment and treat a different alternative as her reference point. The constraint set will be induced by that reference point rather than the endowment.
The category bias model also adds structure to the functional representation. Specifically, within a category, the better the alternative -the smaller the constraint set it generates. As discussed earlier, this property has an intuitive flavor: the more content the agent with her current reference, the less alternatives she will consider from its perspective.
The models make different predictions in the presence of a non-trivial partition on X. To illustrate, consider a decision maker facing three job opportunities: An academic position in a top university (A), an academic position in a small university (a) and a consultant position at a private firm (P ). The categories in this simplified example will naturally be academic jobs and non-academic jobs. Assume that when the agent considers the positions while unemployed she ranks the private firm on top, then the more prestige academic job followed by the small university.
Suppose further that when the agent is working at the small university, she feels drawn to academia and reveals it by choosing (A) from these three options. Given the above, what would the agent choose when currently at the small university and facing an offer only from the private firm?
According to both models the first ranking reveals that U (P ) > U (A) > U (a). According to the SQB Model, that combined with the second choice is only compatible with (P ) not being considered from the point of view of (a), i.e., P / ∈ Q(a). This implies the academic job at the small university would be chosen over the consultant position if only the two were available. Formally, c({a, P } , a) = {a} . This observation highlights a certain rigidity of the SQB Model. If the less prestige academic position, (a), highlights academia so that the agent reverses her choices between (A) and (P ) compared to the choice when unemployed, it must cause the same type of reversal between (a) and (P ). This seems quite unreasonable in situations in which the endowment is an "inferior option" in the utility sense which nevertheless generates a liking to alternatives of similar nature. The added category structure proposed here, allows this attraction to alternatives of similar nature without leading to the less plausible choice reversal. Specifically, the category bias model breaks the link between the two choice reversals since the constraint set is generated by the academic job at the top university (A) rather than by (a). Specifically, the agent disregards (P ), from the point of view of the highly prestige academic job (A) which belongs to the same category (academia) as her current position. Thus, after observing the second choice we may only conclude that 
SQB Model c({a,A,P},a) = A c({a,P},a) = a U(P)>U(A)>U(a) U(P)>U(A)>U(a)
Academic Positions Academic Positions
Category of Category of
Figure IV: SQB Model and Category Bias Model
P /
∈ Q(A). Hence, it is completely plausible that P ∈ Q(a), in line with the monotonic structure of the constraint sets [Q(A) ⊆ Q(a)]. In this case, our model predicts c({a, P } , a) = {P } .
Thus, the category bias model allows to relax the rigidity of the SQB Model through the first step of the choice procedure, namely the link between the exogenous endowment and the endogenous reference point. It is only from the latter's perspective that some alternatives are being excluded from the final maximization stage. Figure IV illustrates the different constraint sets implied by the above choices according to the two models.
It is important to note that even if we add the category structure to the SQB Model and impose that for every alternative x ∈ X we have X x ⊆ Q(x) we will still obtain the same rigidity in terms of the predictions described above. This is due to the fact that the agent's ranking when unemployed alongside her choice when employed in (a) would still imply P / ∈ Q(a). Thus, the main difference between the two models is generated by the first step of the choice procedure rather than simply the added category structure of our framework.
Examples
This section presents a few examples that illustrate the type of choice behavior allowed by our model.
Example 1. (Rational Choice)
A decision maker who is not vulnerable to any reference effects and simply maximizes utility can be described by our model. In fact, we can describe such an agent by imposing two different restrictions -one on the exogenous partition, the other on the endogenous constraint set.
• Example 1.1 (Coarsest Partition Rational Choice) Consider the coarsest exogenous partition on the grand set X where all alternatives belong to a single category. Suppose the agent faces choice problem (S, x). In the first step of her choice procedure, she identifies the best feasible alternative in x's category, say alternative z, which in this example is the best alternative overall in S. Since z ∈ Q(z), our agent will consider z in her final maximization stage (perhaps alongside other alternatives) and choose it as she would absent an endowment.
• Example 1.2 (Largest Constraint Set Rational Choice) Our agent may also act as a utility maximizer when the partition on X contains more than one category. This may be the case if her constraint set is so large that she considers the whole space X from the viewpoint of every alternative. Formally, we describe such behavior by setting Q(x) := X, for every x ∈ X. Here, the endogenous reference has no bite in terms of choice since the decision maker deems all alternatives choosable prior to arriving at her final choice.
Example 2. (No Extreme Status Quo Bias)
Our decision maker cannot exhibit extreme status quo bias, i.e., c(S, x) = {x} for every choice problem (S, x). To this end, consider two alternatives in the same category x 1 and x 2 and assume U (x 1 ) > U (x 2 ). 11 If the agent faces the problem (S, x 2 ) where x 1 ∈ S, she will never keep x 2 as her final choice. Rather, she will choose from S ∩ Q(z), where z ∈ X x 1 and U (z) ≥ U (x 1 ). Since z ∈ Q(z), x 2 will not be chosen at her final maximization stage. 12
Example 3. (Brand Loyalty / Switching Costs) A natural interpretation of exogenous categories in our framework is that of brand names within a specific product market (goods of the same brand are easier to compare due to their similar features while across brands the comparison may be harder). Given this interpretation, our model gives rise to psychological switching costs where some goods of a competing brand may have been chosen before the agent's initial purchase but may not be considered ex post. This naturally leads to brand loyalty, i.e., individuals' tendency to repurchase products of the same brand over and over again. Notice the agent may well switch among different goods (thus not exhibiting status quo bias) but she is more likely to stick to her current brand.
Example 4. (Extreme Category Bias) Consider a decision maker who is extremely vulnerable to category bias. Such an agent may be described by our model when setting Q(x) ⊆ X x for every x ∈ X, which implies she would never leave her endowment's category. In the context of our previous example, such a consumer would be 100 percent loyal to her brand.
Example 5. (No Cycles) Our choice model does not allow the agent to exhibit cycles. For instance, for any distinct alternatives x, y and z, the agent cannot make the following choices: {y} = c({x, y} , x), z ∈ c({y, z} , y) and x ∈ c({x, z} , z). For, if she does, these statements would entail U (y) > U (x), U (z) ≥ U (y) and U (x) ≥ U (z), yielding a contradiction. Note that we reach this contradiction regardless of the category structure on the space. Thus, a decision maker described by our model exhibits a certain level of rationality which prevents her from exhibiting cyclic choices. 13
Status Quo Bias Under Uncertainty: Findings and Predictions
The status quo bias (SQB) is a well known behavioral phenomenon originally introduced by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) which describes decision makers' tendency to not give up their initial endowment. Over the past 30 years evidence for this bias has emerged from a wide range of markets and for different types of goods. 14 Despite the abundance of evidence in support of the bias, some experimental studies have shown that its emergence is context dependent. One example comes from the endowment effect literature in the world of uncertainty. In this literature the bias takes the form of a gap between the minimum compensation demanded by an agent for a good that she owns and the maximum price she is willing to pay for the same good (Thaler, 1980) . Many studies report this gap for risky lotteries, i.e., gambles which pay monetary outcomes with known probabilities, as well as for ambiguous bets, i.e., gambles which pay monetary payoffs contingent on realizations of states which have no specified probabilities. 15 However, as one would expect, such a gap does not arise in evaluations of fixed monetary payoffs as shown by Kahneman et al. (1991) .
More recently, Maltz and Romagnoli (2015) test directly for SQB in the world of uncertainty and find that when the endowment and the alternative are risky lotteries, the bias is absent. 16 They also report its absence when both alternatives are ambiguous bets. However, they find that when the endowment is risky and the alternative ambiguous, or vice versa, the bias emerges, a finding supported by Roca et al. (2006) . Table I summarizes these experimental findings alongside those from the endowment effect literature. It reports whether SQB is present or absent for all combinations of the type of endowment and alternative in the world of uncertainty. 17 The table reveals a pattern which can be described using the notion of categories: when the endowment and alternative belong to the same category, i.e., monetary payoffs, risky lotteries or ambiguous bets, SQB is absent. When they belong to different categories, the bias emerges.
The model suggested in this paper is able to predict these findings using the interpretation of categories suggested above. Facing choice problems in which alternatives belong to the same category, our agent is able to compare options easily and arrives at her final choice unaffected by her endowment. However, when the choice set contains alternatives from different categories, comparisons are no longer so simple. In such contexts, a reference point arises and induces a constraint set for consideration. When there are only two feasible alternatives (the endowment and another alternative) which belong to different categories, as in the experimental SQB literature, the reference point is, in fact, the endowment itself. Therefore, the constraint set induced by it may very well lead the agent to exhibit SQB.
Other well known paradigms of choice with initial endowment are unable to predict the pattern observed in Table I . Specifically, models based on the loss aversion approach by Tversky (1979, 1991) ,where losses loom larger than gains, typically predict the bias in each of the table's entries. Alternatively, models of incomplete preferences in the spirit of Bewley (1986) predict a bias only in the presence of ambiguity. 18 Thus, they would fail to predict the bias when the endowment is a monetary payoff and the alternative 15 See for example Knetsch and Sinden (1984) , Eisenberger and Weber (1995) and Isoni et al. (2011) . 16 Dean (2008) and Ren (2014) , who study the effect of the size of the choice set on SQB, also find that for small choice sets consisting of risky lotteries the bias is weak and sometimes absent.
17 One has to be slightly careful in interpreting evidence of an endowment effect for gambles as status quo bias between gambles and monetary payoffs. The reason is that when studying the endowment effect for a gamble subjects are typically asked how much they would pay to purchase the gamble or how much they would accept to give it up. However, there is no "neutral" frame in which subjects are simply asked to choose between a monetary amount and the gamble. As pointed out by Kahneman et al. (1991) the gap is mostly (but not entirely) due to the higher evaluation of owners rather than a lower evaluation of the non-owners. In this table we interpret these findings as evidence of at least some disparity arising in both types of frames compared to the neutral one.
18 For example the models by Ortoleva (2010) and Mihm and Ozbek (2012 
An Application: A Novel Source of Risk Premium
We now turn to apply our representation to the analysis of a stylized financial setup. 20 In this example we will describe an agent who not only follows the procedure described in Theorem 1 but also has more structure on her constraint sets. This structure has been developed by Ortoleva (2010) in his model accounting for SQB under uncertainty. His model describes a constrained maximizer who takes her endogenous endowment as her reference point, very much like the SQB model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) . However, his setup uses a more structured space which translates into added structure on the constraint set. In his paper, he uses the example we are about to borrow to show how a status quo biased agent may generate risk premium even if she is risk neutral as long as she is "pessimistic enough" in a manner to be described below. Using our model with categories, we will show that such premium may be generated for a risk neutral agent even if we relax the degree of pessimism. Consider an economy in which there is one risk neutral representative agent (with U (x) = x), a government bond and a stock. There are two possible states of the world: s g , the good state, and s b , the bad state. The bond is traded for the price p b and yields, with certainty, $B. The stock, priced at p st , yields payoffs $M and $m, respectively, in the two states of the world, where m < B < M . The representative agent currently holds her money in the checking account which yields no interest and can choose whether to buy the stock, the bond, or not to invest (keep the money in the checking account). To keep the analysis simple, we assume that only one of these three actions can be taken. We take the categories in this setup to be uncertain investments (stock) and riskless investments (Bond and Checking).
More formally, define S := {s g , s b }; X := R and F the set of all acts, that is the set of all functions from S into X. We focus on the preferences over three acts: buy the stock, st; buy the bond, b; keep the money in the checking account, c. The agent makes choices according to the procedure described in Theorem 1 with additional structure on her correspondence Q. Formally, the agent has a set Π of possible priors over the states which are interpreted as a set of possible models of the world in her mind. We assume the agent uses ρ absent an endowment and we note that according to Ortoleva (2010) we have that ρ ∈ Π. 21 For any act f the agent's constraint set is defined by:
where E is the expectation operator. Suppose f is the act serving as the agent's endogenous reference point. Before arriving at her final choice, she considers only those investments that generate a higher expected payoff than f according to every model of the world she has in mind. If no available investment satisfies this condition, she chooses f. If some investments satisfy this condition, she chooses the best among them according to the market prior ρ. Define as π the prior in Π which assigns the lowest probability to s g .
We will now analyze the agent's choices in this environment given that
First notice that since B > p b the bond is a better investment than leaving the money in the checking account. Second, recall that the agent's exogenous endowment is the checking account but her endogenous reference is the bond since it is the best feasible alternative in the endowment's category (of riskless investments). In order for the stock to be traded it must be considered from the bond's perspective. If p b = p st we have from (5)
Moreover, his representation ensures that ρ is in the relative interior of Π.
which means, in other words, s / ∈ Q(b) and the stock would not be traded. Therefore if the stock is traded in the market we must have s ∈ Q(b) which in our context translates into
which implies p st < p b . The implication is that the stock must be priced below the price of the bond for it to be sold although the bond and the stock have the same expected payoff according to the prior ρ which the agent uses when she has no status quo option. Let us now compute the risk premium in this economy. For the bond, the rate of return is simply r b :=
. The stock's rate of return according to the market is
As p st < p b , we obtain r st > r b . Thus we find a positive risk premium in this economy, even though the agent is risk neutral.
As noted earlier, a risk premium in this setting can also be generated by the model of Ortoleva (2010) . The difference is that in his model, the agent needs to exhibit a higher degree of pessimism than that ascribed to her by (5). Specifically, in order to deliver a premium in that model, one needs to change (5) into
This implies that in the case of p b = p st , the agent would not choose the stock over the checking account even if those were the only available options. Thus, her π needs to assign a lower probability to s g than that required by (5). In other words, Ortoleva (2010) shows how the channel of SQB may lead to risk premium given a sufficiently high degree of pessimism as reflected through the agent's endogenous "worst case scenario" probability. Our model allows generating a risk premium through the category channel while relaxing the agent's pessimism. Specifically, in the first step of the choice procedure the bond becomes the agent's reference point. In turn, the bond sets a "higher bar" for the stock if it is to be chosen compared to the "bar" that would have been set if the checking account acted as reference. This requires the stock to be more attractive in order to be chosendriving its price down and generating a risk premium. Importantly, using parameters that satisfy inequality 5 but not 6, our model would generate a risk premium while Ortoleva (2010) would not. 22 That is the sense in which our model provides a novel source of risk premium.
If this market is studied using the standard expected utility model, it may seem as if the agent is risk averse. In fact, if she is risk averse, the risk premium we calculated would be even higher, due to the agent's endogenous reference point's constraint set as well as her degree of risk aversion. Thus, if the observer ignored the choice procedure suggested in our model and the role of the categories in this setup, she would consider the agent as much more risk averse than she actually is. In the macro-finance literature this is known as the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) , where very high levels of risk aversion are required to reconcile the risk premium observed in financial markets. Ortoleva (2010) provides the SQB channel as a possible missing ingredient to the puzzle requiring a certain degree of pessimism in the process. Our model adds the category channel which supports the emergence of a risk premium while allowing for both more reasonable levels of risk aversion and pessimism.
Conclusion
We develop a model of choice with initial endowment and in the presence of alternatives that are grouped into disjoint categories. When our agent starts off with an exogenous endowment, it is linked at the first stage of the choice procedure to an endogenous reference point. The reference point induces a constraint set from which the agent makes her final choice by maximizing her endowment-free utility.
The choice procedure suggested in this work may be considered as a bridge between two approaches to reference dependent choice. One considers the reference point an endogenous construct while the other turns to the exogenous endowment as the natural candidate to create reference effects. According to our model, the endowment does affect choice but in a more indirect way than that suggested by the latter approach. Its role amounts to highlighting the category to which it belongs, directing the agent to the best feasible alternative in that category in the process. From this stage onwards, the endowment becomes irrelevant, while the newly identified point serves as her reference point.
The model generalizes the status quo bias phenomenon allowing the agent to be attracted to her endowment's category rather than the endowment itself, a phenomenon we dub category bias. We show its flexible reference effects and compare it to the status quo bias model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) . Recent findings regarding the presence and absence of status quo bias in the world of uncertainty are shown to be well accommodated by the suggested procedure. Finally, we provide a simple illustration of how category bias can generate risk premium even with risk neutral agents.
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove the "if" part of the theorem. Let U : X → R be a function and Q a self-correspondence on X, that satisfy properties (a) and (b) and take any choice correspondence c on C(X) that satisfies (1) and (2) for any (S, σ) ∈ C(X). We first make the following observations:
Proof of Claim 1.1. Follows immediately from property (a).
Proof of Claim 1.2. Since c is a choice correspondence on C(X), we must have c({x} , x) = {x} for any x ∈ X. Our claim thus follows from (2).
WARP. For the case in which σ = ♦ it is trivial. So take x ∈ X and choice problems (S, x), (T, x) such that T ⊆ S and c(S, x) ∩ T = ∅.
In view of claim 1.1 and (2) this is obvious. Case 2: arg max U (S ∩ X x ) ∩ arg max U (T ∩ X x ) = ∅. Letz ∈ arg max U (S ∩ X x ) and z ∈ arg max U (T ∩ X x ). By case 2, U (z) > U (z). Let y ∈ c(S, x) ∩ T. By (2), y ∈ arg max U (S ∩ Q(z)). Thus, y ∈ T ∩ Q(z). By property (a), Q(z) ⊆ Q(z). Therefore, y ∈ T ∩ Q(z). Let t ∈ arg max U (T ∩ Q(z)). We are to show that U (y) ≥ U (t).
2.1. y ∈ X x . In this case, y ∈ arg max U (S ∩ X x ). Since T ⊆ S this implies y ∈ arg max U (T ∩ X x ), contradicting case 2.
y /
∈ X x . By the choice of t,
. We obtain U (y) ≥ U (z) > U (t), a contradiction. Therefore t / ∈ X x and by property (b) we obtain t ∈ Q(z). Hence, t ∈ S ∩ Q(z) and so U (y) ≥ U (t).
To show the second inclusion, let y ∈ c(T, x). By (2) y ∈ arg max U (T ∩ Q(z)). Let q ∈ arg max U (S ∩ Q(z)) ∩ T. Since Q(z) ⊆ Q(z) it follows that q ∈ T ∩ Q(z). By choice of y, we have U (y) ≥ U (q). We are thus left to show that y ∈ S ∩ Q(z). Since y ∈ T ⊆ S, this reduces to y ∈ Q(z). We consider the following three cases: 2.3. q ∈ X x . We must have q ∈ arg max U (S ∩ X x ) which in turn implies that q ∈ arg max U (T ∩ X x ) contradicting case 2.
q /
∈ X x , y / ∈ X x . Since q ∈ Q(z), y ∈ Q(z), and U (y) ≥ U (q) we can use property (b) to obtain y ∈ Q(z).
∈ X x , y ∈ X x . Since y ∈ T we have y ∈ T ∩ X x . By case 2, U (z) > U (y). By claim 1.2z ∈ Q(z) and hencez ∈ S ∩ Q(z). We obtain U (q) ≥ U (z) > U (y), a contradiction.
WSQB. Take any x, y ∈ X and suppose that x ∈ c({x, y} , y). By (2), x ∈ arg max U ({x, y} ∩ Q(z)) where z ∈ arg max U ({x, y} ∩ X y ). If y ∈ arg max U ({x, y} ∩ X y ), we have x ∈ Q(y). By claim 1.2 we obtain U (x) ≥ U (y), which by (1) is equivalent to x ∈ c({x, y} , ♦). If y / ∈ arg max U ({x, y} ∩ X y ) then x ∈ X y and U (x) > U (y) which by (1) yields c({x, y} , ♦) = {x} . On the other hand, if x ∈ c({x, y} , ♦), that is, U (x) ≥ U (y), then x ∈ arg max U ({x, y} ∩ X x ). and in view of claim 1.2, x ∈ arg max U ({x, y} ∩ Q(x)). By (2) we obtain x ∈ c({x, y} , x) as we sought.
CSQI. Take any (S, x) ∈ C(X) and let z ∈ arg max U (S ∩ X x ). Suppose that c(T, x) ⊆ X x for every subset T of S such that [S ∩ X x ] ⊂ T. If S is a singleton we have c(S, x) = {x} = c(S, ♦) because c is a choice correspondence. If S is not a singleton then, by hypothesis, y ∈ c({y} ∪ (S ∩ X x ), x) for every y ∈ S \ X x . That is, y ∈ Q(z) for every y ∈ S \ X x . Moreover, by claims 1.1 and 1.2 we obtain arg max U (S ∩ X x ) ⊆ Q(z). Note that
Denote the sets in the decomposition by A, B and C respectively. We have already obtained A ⊆ Q(z) as well as B ⊆ Q(z). Note that arg max U (S) = arg max U (S \ C).
Hence,
where the fourth equality follows from z ∈ B ∩ Q(z) and U (z) > U (c) for every c ∈ C.
CRE. Let S ∈ Ω X such that x, y ∈ S ∩ X x . Take any z ∈ arg max U (S ∩ X x ). By (2) c(S, x) = arg max U (S ∩ Q(z)) = c(S, y), as we sought.
We now move to prove the "only if" part of Theorem 1. 23 Let c be a choice correspondence on C(X) that satisfies WARP, WSQB, CSQI and CRE. Define the binary relation on X by y x if and only if y ∈ c({x, y} , ♦) Using a standard argument based on WARP it can easily be shown that is a complete preorder on X and that c(S, ♦) = {ω ∈ S : ω x for all x ∈ S} for every S ∈ Ω X . Furthermore since X is finite there exists a real function U on X such that y x if and only if U (y) ≥ U (x) for any x, y ∈ X. Therefore: c(S, ♦) = arg max {U (ω) : ω ∈ S} for every S ∈ Ω X . Claim 1.3. Let X i ⊂ X be a cell in the partition. Take any S ∈ Ω X such that S ⊆ X i . Then, c(S, s) = c(S, ♦) for every s ∈ S.
Proof of Claim 1.3. Let S ∈ Ω X be as in the claim and take any s ∈ S. For the first inclusion let y ∈ c(S, s) and take any z ∈ c(S, ♦). By CRE, y ∈ c(S, z). By WARP we obtain y ∈ c({y, z} , z) and by WSQB we have that y ∈ c({y, z} , ♦). Applying WARP again we get y ∈ c(S, ♦). The second inclusion follows similar arguments. Claim 1.4. Let X i ⊂ X be a cell in the partition. For any x, y ∈ X i and z ∈ X we have:
x ∈ c({x, y} , ♦) and z ∈ c({x, z} , x) ⇒ z ∈ c({y, z} , y).
Proof of Claim 1.4. Let x, y ∈ X i and z ∈ X. If z ∈ X i then by claim 1.3 and WARP the proof is complete. So suppose z / ∈ X i . Consider the following three cases:
Case 1: z ∈ c({x, y, z} , y). WARP implies z ∈ c({y, z} , y) as we sought.
Case 2: x ∈ c({x, y, z} , y). By CRE x ∈ c({x, y, z} , x). WARP implies:
c({x, y, z} , x) ∩ {x, z} = c({x, z} , x).
By assumption z ∈ c({x, z} , x) so we conclude z ∈ c({x, y, z} , x). By CRE once again we have that z ∈ c({x, y, z} , y) and we are back in Case 1 and so z ∈ c({y, z} , y).
Case 3: y ∈ c({x, y, z} , y). CRE implies y ∈ c({x, y, z} , x). By WARP y ∈ c({x, y} , x).
By assumption x ∈ c({x, y} , ♦). Using WSQB we obtain x ∈ c({x, y} , x). Combining, we obtain c({x, y} , x) = {x, y} . Using WARP once again we have c({x, y, z} , x) ∩ {x, y} = c({x, y} , x) = {x, y} .
We may conclude x ∈ c({x, y, z} , x) and using CRE that x ∈ c({x, y, z} , y) which brings us back to Case 2. Conclusion: z ∈ c({y, z} , y) which completes the proof of Claim 1.4.
Suppose c(T, z) ⊆ X x . Take any y ∈ c(T, z). c(T, z) ∩ {y, z, ω} = ∅. We may apply WARP to obtain c(T, z) ∩ {y, z, ω} = c({y, z, ω} , z). Thus, given our assumption, we have c({y, z, ω} , z) ⊆ X x . This means that ω / ∈ c({y, z, ω} , z).
Moreover, y ∈ c({y, z, ω} , z). We may apply WARP once more to get c({y, z, ω} , z) ∩ {y, z} = c({y, z} , z).
z ∈ X x and by assumption also y ∈ X x and thus in view of Claim 1.3, c({y, z} , z) = c({y, z} , ♦). Combined with (12), we may conclude c({y, z, ω} , z) ∩ {y, z} = c({y, z} , z) = c({y, z} , ♦).
By the fact that z ∈ arg max U (S∩X x ) and y ∈ X x we have that z ∈ c({y, z} , ♦). Therefore, z ∈ c({y, z, ω} , z). Apply WARP once again to obtain c({y, z, ω} , z)∩{z, ω} = c({z, ω} , z). By (11) this implies that ω / ∈ c({z, ω} , z). Hence, c({z, ω} , z) = {z} which contradicts (10). Conclusion: c(T, z) ⊆ X x . Thus we may apply CSQI to conclude that Claim 1.8 holds.
Together with Claim 1.7 and CRE we obtain: c(S, x) = c(S, z) = c(S ∩ Q(z), z) = c(S ∩ Q(z), ♦) which in view of (1) completes the proof of Theorem 1.
B Proof of Independence of Axioms
Let X = {x 1 , x 2 , y} with the following partition X = {x 1 , x 2 } {y} .
Define c on C(X) as follows: c(S, ♦) = S, ∀S ∈ Ω X \ {x 1 , y} , and c({x 1 , y} , ♦) = {y} , and whenever x 1 or x 2 are the endowment the choices are made by picking the best alternatives according to the preference relation x 1 ∼ x 2 y. Finally, when y is the endowment the choice follow according to y x 1 ∼ x 2 . This choice correspondence satisfies CRE, WSQB and CSQI but does not satisfy WARP.
Next, consider c on C(x) defined by: With no endowment choices are made by picking the best alternatives according to the following ordering: y x 1 ∼ x 2 , and c(S, ω) = S, ∀(S, ω) ∈ C(X) where ω ∈ {x 1 , x 2 } , and c(S, y) = {y} , ∀(S, y) ∈ C(X).
This choice correspondence satisfies CRE, WARP and WSQB but not CSQI.
If we define c on C(X) as follows: c(S, ♦) = S, ∀S ∈ Ω X , and c(S, ω) = {ω} , ∀(S, ω) ∈ C(X) where ω ∈ X.
We obtain that it satisfies WARP, WSQB, CSQI but not CRE.
Finally, define c on C(X) as follows: With no endowment choices are made by picking the best alternatives according to the following ordering: x 1 ∼ x 2 y, and c(S, ω) = {ω} , ∀(S, ω) ∈ C(X) where ω ∈ {x 1 , y} , and when x 2 is the endowment the choice are made by following x 1 x 2 y. This choice correspondence satisfies WARP, CRE and CSQI but fails WSQB.
C CSQI and SQI
We first introduce formally axiom SQI as taken from Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) .
Status Quo Irrelevance (SQI) [Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) ]. For any given (S, x), suppose that c(T, x) = {x} for every non-singleton subset T of S with x ∈ T ⊆ S and that {y} = c({y, x} , ♦) for some y ∈ S. Then, c(S, x) = c(S, ♦).
We will actually consider the relationship between our CSQI and a slightly different version of SQI which we call SQI*:
Status Quo Irrelevance* (SQI*). For any given (S, x), suppose that c(T, x) = {x} for every non-singleton subset T of S with x ∈ T ⊆ S. Then, c(S, x) = c(S, ♦).
As pointed out by Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) their model satisfies this slightly stronger version of irrelevance (does not require {y} = c({y, x} , ♦) for some y ∈ S) which will be the target of our comparison.
We first show that CSQI =⇒ SQI*. Suppose that whenever the agent faces no endowment or whenever endowed with x 2 or y she chooses according to the following preference relation: y x 2 x 1 . When endowed with x 1 her choice follows y x 2 ∼ x 1 . This choice correspondence satisfies CSQI. However, c({x 1 , x 2 } , x 1 ) = {x 1 , x 2 } yet c({x 1 , x 2 } , x 1 ) = c({x 1 , x 2 } , ♦) violating SQI*.
